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Abstract 
Students of history and philosophy of science courses at my University are either naïve robust realists or naïve relativists in relation to sci-
ence and technology. The first group absorbs from culture stereotypical conceptions, such as the value-free character of the scientific 
method, that science and technology are impervious to history or ideology, and that science and religion are always at odds. The second 
believes science and technology were selected arbitrarily by ideologues to have privileged world views of reality to the detriment of other 
interpretations. These deterministic outlooks must be challenged to make students aware of the social importance of their future roles, be 
they as scientists and engineers or as science and technology policy decision makers. The University as Decision Center (DC) not only re-
produces the social by teaching standard solutions to well-defined problems but also provides information regarding conflict resolution and 
the epistemological, individual, historical, social, and political mechanisms that help create new science and technology. Interdisciplinary 
research prepares students for roles that require science and technology literacy, but raises methodological issues in the context of the 
classroom as it increases uncertainty with respect to apparently self-evident beliefs about scientific and technological practices.  
Keywords: STS, science, technology, practice, uncertainty, University, policy making 
 
Introduction 
My experience teaching courses in history and philosophy 
of science in the Arts & Humanities and the Science & 
Mathematics Divisions has been that undergraduate stu-
dents start out as either naïve robust realists or naïve rela-
tivists in relation to science and technology. The first 
group absorbs from freshmen science courses and society 
at large stereotypical models of scientific and technologi-
cal progress and change. Some of their conservative be-
liefs are the neutrality of scientific observation, that sci-
ence is strictly rational, value free and a-historical, that 
technology is neutral in relation to politics, that science 
and technology are impervious to ideology, that science 
and religion are antagonistic forces, and that Western sci-
ence emerged independently from cultures. To them, sci-
ence and technology are always epistemologically privi-
leged areas of human inquiry. Since, according to this 
pseudo-positivistic view, social forces are absent from the 
production of science and technology itself, history and 
sociology of science and technology are valuable only in 
so far as they deconstruct instances of human error or mis-
conduct. But naïve scientific realism coupled with every-
day use of technological artifacts does not parallel knowl-
edge of scientific and technological practices themselves 
or reflect understanding of their historical, philosophical, 
and sociological underpinnings.  
A second group includes students who, coming from the 
arts and the humanities, not only are, just as the first, awed 
by the thought processes, technical methodologies, and 
work ethic involved in the practice of science and technol-
ogy but are naïve relativists in relation to their epistemo-
logical warrant. Informed by the post-modernist vision 
predominant in literary criticism courses, as well as in 
courses in anthropology, feminism and other standpoint 
epistemologies, and by the proliferation of cultural studies, 
they assume that science and technology are instruments 
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of oppression. To them, their emergence in the West was 
arbitrarily brought about by those who set out to destroy 
other epistemologically legitimate views of reality. These 
two groups are almost college-level analogs to C.P. 
Snow’s “two cultures” dichotomy. But they both share a 
characteristic blindness toward the importance of conflict 
and competition in the production of new science and 
technology and, therefore, a deterministic and skeptic out-
look regarding public policy.  
Thinking that not much can be done to change the direc-
tion of science and technology by actively participating in 
their development or social outcomes is evidenced by stu-
dents’ acceptance of the inevitability of scientific and 
technological processes. These are reflected in the disci-
plinary boundaries found in college, the internalism inher-
ent to freshmen science and technology courses, and the 
institutional gap between experts and nonexperts. As soci-
ologist of science Sal Restivo said in a different context, 
science and technology are taken as “givens” rather than 
as “problems”(Restivo in Chubin & Chu, 1989). 
The University has the role of Decision Center (DC) for 
diffusion and producer of information not only in respect 
to agreed upon standards of science and technology le-
gitimacy, but also on the historical, epistemological, social, 
and political mechanisms involved in their production 
(Lawless & Castelao, 2001). We argue that a transforma-
tion of vision can be achieved in science and technology 
studies (STS) courses. Only interdisciplinary research of-
fers a diversity of angles from which undergraduate stu-
dents approach scientific and technological practices. Here 
the focus is primarily on history and philosophy of sci-
ence. Lectures, class readings, research projects, and 
background bibliography, however, include parts of other 
fields in STS such as sociology of science, science policy, 
and philosophy and sociology of technology. 
History 
From its inception in Europe during the Middle Ages until 
the present, Universities have been at one time mirrors and 
producers of perceptions of science and technology as 
much as initiators of social change. The role of the Uni-
versity has always been that of organizing and re-packing 
information, assimilating new into old, from consensus 
after tension, and of response to political and social needs. 
Examples from the history of science are the assimilation 
of Aristotelian physics into Christian cosmology, the shift 
from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy, calendar reform, 
and the introduction of scientific technology (meridians, 
telescope, microscope, etc.). Semi-standardization and 
dissemination of scientific information allowed by the 
printing press, the emergence of the professional scientist, 
as well as the connection between mechanical conceptions 
of nature, religion, and state power also come to mind. 
Until recently universities (as well as the scientific Acad-
emies from the seventeenth century on) were reserved for 
the aristocrats, the clergy, and other intellectual elite. They 
could thrive, produce scientific revolutions, and redefine 
the links between science and society while inflation, dis-
ease, hunger, and war ran rampant and hit the illiterate 
populace the hardest. Presently, almost everybody in the 
United States and other countries has access to higher 
education. Research (be it pure or applied) is expected to 
accrue rapid social benefits for the majority, which, in ad-
dition, is entitled to participate in the political process in-
volved in scientific and technological choices. At this time 
in their history, Universities must continue to prepare 
young people to replicate the social and epistemological 
order by teaching how to solve well-defined scientific and 
technological problems but also to give tools to resolve ill-
defined problems such as unintended consequences of 
technological systems which can no longer be rejected 
(like nuclear energy) and scientific uncertainty. Ability to 
assess risks in science and technology and solve problems 
whose solution has not been already predetermined by the 
collective includes making visible the role of tension and 
agreement in the development of science and technology. 
Since it is at the level of the solution of ill-defined prob-
lems that the social, political, and non-epistemic nature of 
science and technology comes through, it is precisely here 
that one can better access the historical and philosophical 
roots of scientific and technological legitimization. 
Even though many will not become scientists or engineers, 
all students ought to believe from what they learn in STS 
courses that they can have an invaluable input in social 
issues connected to scientific and technological develop-
ment. This expectation can only be fulfilled once a realis-
tic understanding of the mechanisms behind technological 
systems (be they engineering or political) as well as the 
plurality of cognitive and non-cognitive, personal and non-
personal, epistemic and non-epistemic goals of science are 
achieved. Another goal of the university is to inform stu-
dents about the contributions of culture to the construction 
of universally accepted standards of scientific and techno-
logical knowledge and, therefore, their objectivity despite 
historical and social embededness.  
Informing Methodologies 
Understandably, the above aims are difficult to pursue in 
undergraduate courses in science and technology. There it 
is expected that students assimilate more or less uncriti-
cally those basic principles that inform each area of in-
quiry. In these courses the university acculturates its stu-T. Castelao-Lawless & W.F. Lawless 
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dents with processes stylized and edited to address the 
technical languages and the standards of accepted solu-
tions that reflect its disciplines. Yet, large areas of uncer-
tainty abound whose analysis is, as a rule, only tackled in 
graduate school.  
Informing methodologies to be followed in history and 
philosophy of science courses need to take into account 
stereotypical images of science and technology mentioned 
earlier as they are the ones which students, be they naïve 
realists or naïve relativists, take for granted. True, inform-
ing science’s purpose is to reduce clients’ uncertainty to 
produce maximization of outcomes. But, since students’ 
naïve perceptions of science and technology are taken by 
them as true, the first step is to assign reading materials 
and projects which increase uncertainty in relation to these 
apparently self-evident beliefs.  
Examples used in history of science courses for the spe-
cific purpose of producing uncertainty in the naïve robust 
realists are: 
•  Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 
(on the historical development of the concept of syphi-
lis according to disease theory, medical advancements, 
and social pressures);  
•  Shapin’s Scientific Revolution (shows that traditional 
demarcations between science and society are mis-
leading; and that the seventeenth century revolution 
did not reach consensus over the mechanization of na-
ture, the role of mathematics, or the legitimacy of 
technology in reproducing “reality”);  
•  Winner’s The Whale and the Reactor (demonstrates 
that artifacts can embody political agendas and their 
designs are flexible until “closed” by social consen-
sus);  
•  MacKenzie and Wajcman’s The Social Shaping of 
Technology (offers an  overview of historical and phi-
losophical positions in relation to technology, includ-
ing technological determinism, social constructivism, 
and the political nature of urban and household tech-
nologies).  
Works such as these provide excellent case studies for an 
externalist history of the social-technology-science net-
work model. They show ambiguities and tensions occur-
ring before consensus (or justified true beliefs) becomes 
formalized in artifacts and scientific narratives.  
Other works further emphasize the artificial nature of the 
demarcation science/society and science/non-science. For 
instance, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(shows that science is contextually adaptive; that world 
views build metaphysical, instrumental, theoretical, meth-
odological commitments, and expectations which deter-
mine in large measure what scientists see and what they 
look for); Feyerabend’s Farewell to Reason (on the 
pseudo-esoteric nature of science and the importance of 
treating science and alternative explanations of reality 
symmetrically); and Crosby’s The Measure of Reality (ar-
gues that quantification so characteristic of seventeenth 
century science emerged centuries earlier in religion, 
painting, music, and commerce; also that the quantified, 
mechanical world-view depended on a gradual shift in 
conceptions of time and space). 
More sophisticated history of science books produce un-
certainty in the apparently self-evident belief that science 
and religion have always been antagonistic social forces. 
Analyses offered in Lindberg and Numbers’ God and Na-
ture show that tensions and agreements between science 
and religion from Plato to Einstein contributed to their 
mutual growth. For example, many seventeenth century 
scientists were people of the Church who fulfilled reli-
gious agendas while defending mechanical conceptions of 
nature and contributing to the rational advancement of 
scientific inquiry.  On the other hand, Lindberg and West-
man’s Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution is effective 
in showing the shifting social role of the engineer, the 
physicist, and the physician as well as the introduction of 
mathematics and engineering in European universities’ 
curricula.  
Literature in philosophy of science courses also challenges 
traditional beliefs about the epistemological and social 
mechanisms behind science production. Its purpose is, 
again, to look at science as a problem rather than a given. 
Examples are Bloor’s Knowledge and Social Imagery 
(represents the “Strong Programme” in the sociology of 
science; shows that mathematics has a history of incom-
patible epistemological meanings); again Kuhn’s Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (helps understand, with examples 
from history, the underdetermination of theories by obser-
vation; addresses the conversion techniques involved in 
consensus from conflict over choice of scientific theories 
incommensurable with prevalent metaphysical beliefs); 
Kitcher’s The Advancement of Science (analyzes the non-
epistemic, personal, non-cognitive goals of science, the 
characteristics of human cognitive processes of assimila-
tion and retrieval of information, the divergence and con-
vergence of individual perceptions according to learning 
styles, previous schemata and past scientific practices; 
illustrates these with case studies on the resolution of sci-
entific controversies); and Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge University as Decision Center 
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(addresses the tacit, non-rational or non-verbally commu-
nicable nature of scientific and technical skills).  
Two other books which challenge students’ naïve concep-
tions of science and the scientific methodologies are Put-
nam’s Reason, Truth and History (offers a pragmatist view 
on the value/fact dichotomy; argues that traditional con-
ceptions of objectivity and privileged meta-languages are 
to be redefined if not completely rejected) and Feyera-
bend’s Against Method (shows there is no one standard 
scientific method which all scientists follow sheepishly; 
also, that intuition, creation, innovation, absence of rules, 
anti-dogmatism and anti-authoritarianism are fundamental 
in scientific progress). For the role of instrumentation in 
scientific realism, Hacking’s Representing and Intervening 
(demonstrates the shift from a traditional conception of 
scientific realism to one which includes an instrumental 
ontology for scientific entities); Idhe’s Instrumental Real-
ism (engages in phenomenology of technology, including 
human/machine interface, and AI); and Galison’s How 
Experiments End (shows that theories are embodied in 
scientific technology) are good sources. 
Consequences 
Informing methodologies of the type suggested above are 
not unproblematic. In fact, one usually has to contend with 
consequences of deconstructing the social myth of scien-
tific-technological rationality as well as the academic myth 
of radical constructivism. The first is that students who 
were robust naïve realists assume that relativism, arbitrari-
ness, and irrationality in knowledge follow from the his-
torical and social nature of science. In their turn, the group 
of the naïve relativists will see it as confirmation of con-
spiracy theories about Western scientific and technological 
hegemony. The second effect is that all will have difficulty 
understanding the relevance of historical case studies to 
present social circumstances. Therefore, the possibility of 
their future participation in the science and technology 
policy process is still  not visible to them.  
The first consequence can be addressed with projects 
geared toward analysis of resolutions of scientific contro-
versies from case studies taken from journals such as Sci-
encE, Nature, Scientific American, and National Geo-
graphic. They show the political character of scientific and 
technological decision making, scientific uncertainty and 
risk assessment in both the “hard” and the “soft” sciences, 
the bureaucratic nature of scientific institutions, national 
styles of doing science, and the grant and peer review sys-
tems both in academia and in research institutes. Chubin 
and Chu’s Science Off the Pedestal and Goldfarb’s Taking 
Sides also addresses uncertainty and risk management in 
contemporary scientific and technological problems. These 
sources illustrate scientific and technological conflicts, 
how they are resolved, how they become black-boxed 
from consensus by the scientific community, and how the 
public interferes at the level of research directions and 
social outcomes. They do not, however, detract from the 
demand that scientific inquiry be based on empirical and 
rational assertibility or from cooperation.  
That science ought to be epistemologically on a par with 
less prevailing interpretations of reality can also be coun-
teracted by showing the adverse effects of the presumption 
of relativism/arbitrariness in science in readings such as 
Gross and Levitt’s Higher Superstition; Taubes’ Bad Sci-
ence; Masters’ Beyond Relativism; Gross’s The Rhetoric of 
Science, Levitt’s Prometheus Bedeviled; and Shermer’s 
Why People Believe Weird Things.  
The second consequence, that history and philosophy of 
science are not relevant to understanding current scientific 
and technological controversies, can be resolved with 
comparative studies between past and present science and 
technology practices. Journals which engage students in 
such research projects are, for instance, Perspectives on 
Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social; Isis: An Inter-
national Review devoted to the History of Science and its 
Cultural Influences; Technology and Culture: The Interna-
tional Quarterly of the Society for the History of Technol-
ogy; and Science, Technology, and Human Values.  
Background knowledge specifically addressing the con-
nections between science, technology, and policy can in-
clude Hard and Jamison’s The Intellectual Appropriation 
of Technology; Dickson’s The Politics of Science; Averch’s 
A Strategic Analysis of Science and Technology Policy; 
and Barke’s Science, Technology, and Public Policy. 
Conclusion 
We need to engage undergraduate students in interdiscipli-
nary research. Informing methodologies in STS courses 
will give them the ability to recognize the role of conflict 
in the solution of ill-defined problems in science and tech-
nology and how they have become black-boxed in formal 
science and technology courses. Cooperation in science 
and technology (which is learned in undergraduate 
courses) and competition (which becomes visible in his-
tory of science and other STS courses) are incommensur-
able processes that do not combine under normal circum-
stances. One way to combine them is through the devel-
opment of social structures that manage both together.  
STS courses help students recognize that both naïve real-
ism or naïve relativism in science and technology are erro-
neous models which cannot be used successfully either in T. Castelao-Lawless & W.F. Lawless 
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their future roles as scientists and engineers or in public 
policy. They include informing methodologies that (1) 
increase uncertainty in regard to apparently self-evident 
beliefs about scientific and technological epistemologies 
and practices and (2) convey historical, network models of 
scientific and technological change. Finally, they empha-
size conflict as complementary to cooperation while avoid-
ing uninformed realism, relativism, and scientific and 
technological determinism in relation to public policy. 
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